Tailhook...also known as "A Few Good Men" - Page 2 (2024)

Whenever a crisis erupts that threatens our country's security interests, most of us know the first question usually asked by the President's national security advisers: where are the carriers? And the answer is always the same. They are either on station or proceeding with all due speed into harrn's way. I was in Asia during the tensions that flared just before the Taiwanese elections. Whether the Administration used them property or not, the carriers were there, ready to strike, just as they have been in or near every other hot spot in the last 50 years.

To be more specific, the officers and sailors were there, showing once again why the carrier battle group is the most potent and formidable tactical assemblage in history. As always, the finest combat pilots in the world were in their ready rooms or on the catapults, prepared to do whatever it took to defend the national security interests of the United States. They have never failed our nation, not once. They are smart. They are tough, they are dedicated, they are loyal, they are truly the best we have.

So when the Tailhook investigation began, and certain political elements used the incident to bring discredit on naval aviation as a whole, and then on the Navy writ large, one is entitled to ask, on behalf of these magnificent performers who have never failed their leaders, where were their leaders?

When the acting Secretary of the Navy, who had never spent a day in uniform, called a press conference and announced that the antics of one group of aviators at Tailhook was an indication that the Navy as a whole had cultural problems-cultural, as in ethos, as in the overall body of traits that constitutes an institution's history and traditions--how could the CNO stand next to him and fail to defend the way of life he had spent a career helping to shape?

When Paula Coughlin's commanding officer, who had previously received dual honors as the Navy's outstanding fighter pilot and as commander of its outstanding fighter squadron, was relieved of his command based on a letter she wrote, without being given so much as five minutes to explain his own actions in her case to the admiral who summarily dismissed him, who risked his career by taking Jack Snyder's side?

When one of the finest candidates for Commander in Chief of the Pacific in recent times, a man who flew more than 500 combat missions in Vietnam and then in the Gulf War commanded the largest naval armada since World War II, is ordered into early retirement by the Chief of Naval Operations because one Senator asked on behalf of a constituent why Stan Arthur as Vice Chief of Naval Operations had simply approved a report upholding a decision to wash out a female officer from flight school, who expressed their outrage? Who fought this? Who condemned it?

When a whole generation of officers is asked to accept the flawed wisdom of a permanent stigma and the destruction of the careers of some of the finest aviators in the Navy based on hearsay, unsubstantiated allegations, in some cases after a full repudiation of anonymous charges that resemble the worst elements of McCarthyism, in effect, turning over the time-honored, even sacred, promotional process which lies at the very core of military leadership to a group of Senate staffers, what admiral has had the courage to risk his own career by putting his stars on the table and defending the integrity of the process and of his people?

It should surprise no one that this type of conduct has the result of killing morale down the chain of command and building up resentment, not only against the leadership but also against politically protected sub-groups. Top leaders who seek to minimize or reverse problems in this way simply cause them to become more severe, even among those who otherwise might support the policies.

One wonders whether these admirals really believe that political staffers in the Senate possess more wisdom and judgment than their own officers on matters relating to discipline and qualifications for promotion. If they do, they should resign immediately. If they don't, then they should fight back, not with a memo here and there but by being willing to bet their careers on the soundness of the institution that gave them a career in the first place. Or is there an insinuation here, that their own careers are more important than the dozens that are being ruined, and the thousands that are either deciding to become civilians or are waiting in the balance to see whether leadership can survive in the U.S. Navy?

I was recently shown a very disturbing statistic. Last year, 53% of the post-command commanders in naval aviation left the Navy rather than continue their careers. In no other year, in peace and war, has that number reached even 25%. These were the cream, the very future of the Navy, officers who had performed for two decades in a manner that marked them as potential admirals. They took their commands, they saw how the Navy's being led, and they walked. And who is willing to accept responsibility?

The aftermath of Tailhook was never about inappropriate conduct so much as it was about the lack of wisdom among the Navy's top leadership. Tailhook should have been a three- or maybe a five-day story. Those who were to blame for outrageous conduct should have been disciplined, and those who were not to blame should have been vigorously defended, along with the culture and the mores of the naval service. Instead, we are now at four years and counting, and its casualty list reads like a Who's Who of naval aviation.

These kinds of problems are fixable. It's not difficult to identify them, which is one reason morale has sunk in the fleet. What is difficult is finding people who will insist that they be fixed.